Caribbean Jihadism
Central America and the Caribbean is no stranger to organised, trans-national crime. The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime lists the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people as key issues within the region, with cocaine smuggling emerging as a serious threat to local stability and human life, given the ability of groups to manipulate local politics and exact violence on targeted individuals. Trafficking in the region is especially rife due to difficult-to-patrol coastlines, corruption, and easy access to money laundering capabilities through areas such as the Cayman Islands.
Image Source: Office of the President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
With all of that being said, however, there is one highly focused, and seemingly unusual trend that emerges as a particularly unique security threat: the presence of Jihadist groups in Trinidad & Tobago.
First of all, it is important to define the problem before addressing how it came to be: jihadism refers to the engagement in violent struggle to “eradicate obstacles to restoring God's rule on Earth…[it] is not just a collective obligation, but an individual duty that must be fulfilled by every able Muslim, just like ritual prayer and fasting during Ramadan.” (BBC).
NOTE: Many Muslims do not use this term, as it is viewed as an incorrect association between a noble practicing of faith, and an unacceptable use of force. The word “jihad” itself simply translates to “struggle” or “effort” in English, and in the context of Islam, could refer to any number of things depending on context. The word does not have any ties to violence on its own.
So, why Trinidad & Tobago, a country halfway across the Earth from the Middle East with a population that is 95% non-Muslim?
Tensions between the country’s largest Muslim insurgency, the Jamaat al Muslimeen (JAM), and the local government can be sourced back to a land dispute in the early 1990s, when the group began the construction of housing, a school, a clinic, and a mosque on land without government approval or legal backing. According to Raul Jerrick, from the United States’ Naval Postgraduate School, the group’s evolution from a religious community towards a violent sect took place due to ethnic polarisation and economic repression, compounding on one another until the government’s confiscation of the property led to a fierce backlash by the JAM.
Yasin Abu Bakir, the leader of the Jamaat al Muslimeen’s coup attempt. Image Source: Caribbean National Weekly
During the coup itself, which lasted for six days, 42 armed insurgents stormed the national parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, with a further 72 taking control of a national broadcast station. Hostages (including the Prime Minister) were taken, the police headquarters were bombed, and demands were made that the government and military surrender, the Prime Minister resign, their leader to be made Minister of National Security, and elections called within 90 days. Twenty-four civilians were killed, and dozens more injured. At the end of the six days of violence and negotiations, the Prime Minister signed an amnesty agreement with the JAM, later rescinded by the Privy Council (Trinidad’s highest court), though the members were never re-arrested.
Although there exists an ongoing debate concerning the validity of the amnesty offered, and the coup’s leader, Yasin Abu Bakr, gained his freedom, allegations of criminal activity continued to be associated with the JAM. Until his death, Bakr remained confident that his actions were “in the defence of the people”. The government’s Commission of Enquiry, established after the coup attempt, assert that crime and violence have grown since the incident, with a Senior Magistrate stating that “1990 expanded the dimensions of crime”. The legacy of the coup is still felt as recently as 2017 however, with Trinidad remaining as the nation with the highest per capita number of ISIL recruits in the Western Hemisphere.
To this day, the attempt remains as the Western world’s only Islamist coup.
TAI Score: Degree 2. It is unlikely that the lasting impact of the 1990 coup will have significant consequences at this time. While it does allow for jihadist extremism to exist in the Americas, it is far dwarfed by the same threat existing in the Middle East. Proximity to the United States further guarantees that unless particular conditions for this phenomenon to grow considerably in scope emerge, it is not likely that jihadist violence in Trinidad and Tobago, or the Caribbean region at large, will be of significant concern.
