Limitless, Until It Isn’t
Two years ago, during the Winter Olympics, China’s Xi and Russia’s Putin declared a “no limits partnership” with manifestoes designed to counter American influence throughout the world.
A 1963 cartoon from the Daily Mail depicts the Sino-Soviet split. Source: HistoryAtelier
It’s not the first time this has happened - unsurprisingly, during the Cold War, Mao’s China and Stalin’s USSR formed a positive relationship less than a year after the communists’ victory in the Chinese Civil War, with Mao declaring that China would “lean to one side, ally with the Soviet Union, and form an international united front.” . Such a united front led to the Korean War, as a conflict, expanding far beyond the Korean Peninsula, pulling in forces from all over the globe on both sides. This trend existed throughout the early years of the Cold War, until Moscow and Beijing began to drift apart - conflicts of national strategic interest and debates over ideology (to name but a few) include reasons for what a casual observer may consider to otherwise be a natural alliance between Maoist China and the USSR.
It might not be the last time this falling out happens, either. Experts are already wondering just how limitless the “limitless partnership” announced in 2022 really is.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Russian geopolitical potential greatly withdrew. It had lost direct influence in eastern Europe and central Asia, its GDP was shrinking by a staggering 14% in 1992, and Russia itself had nearly witnessed a new civil war in 1993. Around the same time, the China had entered a series of almost perfectly opposite trends: the GDP was growing by 14%, the political situation remained stable even after the Tiananmen Square Incident, and its borders remained unchanged since 1949. Nevertheless, China needed (and indeed, still needs) oil and natural gas - thus, since Russia had fuel but needed money - and China had money but needed fuel, a Sino-Russian trade relationship was natural. As of 2025, the Power of Siberia pipeline is expected to export approximately 38 billion cubic meters (BCM) of liquified natural gas to China, its peak capacity. At the same time, the recently-announced Power of Siberia 2 pipeline would expand Russian fuel exports to China by a further 50 BCM.
However, the project has hit a number of obstacles. Mongolia (through which the pipeline runs) cancelling its participation, combined with China’s lack of commitment to the Power of Siberia 2 project, demands for low prices, and significant progress in renewable energy production have all contributed to a stalling of the pipeline’s implementation. Even if the project were to be finished and in operation, however, the 88 BCM of gas exported to China would fall far short of the 337.5 BCM of natural gas imported by the EU from Russia in 2021 alone.
Lastly, indirect competition between Russia and China lingers in a number of key locations - especially central Asia, given its geographic location as neighbours to both Russia and China. The Eurasian Research Institute (using data from SIPRI, the international arms export tracker) has announced that the defence economics trend “is most clearly visible in the decline of Russian economic dominance in Central Asia in favour of China, as Russian trade that in the 1990s amounted to USD $110 billion and made up 80% of the region’s trade dropped now to 18.6 billion USD, which is well behind that of China”. This will be especially true in areas outside of weapons exports, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative places a heavy emphasis on central Asian nations.
The story is not particularly different in the Arctic - where the presence of Russian influence is both powerful and entirely justifiable due to geography, although the country sees it as a “privileged sphere of influence”. But as the Arctic becomes globalised due to new, shorter trade routes opening up as a result of climate change, and the extraction of enormous oil and gas deposits there, the area has real risk of becoming a point of tension between fuel-dependent Russia and export-dependent China.
A map depicting but a few areas where Sino-Russian competition can be found. Blank map originally retrieved from TES.com
Turning towards foreign policy, one of the previously mentioned reasons for the collapse in the Sino-Soviet relationship of the Cold War was that of national strategic interest. More specifically, this refers to a lack of consensus over which of the two communist giants - China, or the Soviet Union - would take on the responsibility of leading both the communist world and spreading revolutions in the Global South.
As far as 21st century foreign policy goes, we are absolutely watching history repeat itself: in addition to aforementioned competition over Central Asia and the Arctic, Russian mercenaries guarantee security in northern Africa while local countries like Mali join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Russia has grown closer to Hamas in Gaza while China builds networks aiming to strengthen Palestinian governance, and - perhaps most significantly - China was noticeably quiet and reportedly displeased when Russia deepened its ties with North Korea. Serbian ties with Beijing and Moscow have both been considerably strengthened in recent years, while the same pattern has also emerged in Pakistan (who recently signed on for closer defence ties with Russia, and economic ties with China) and Venezuela (where both Russia and China have congratulated Maduro on his questionable election victory).
These examples are to name but a few countries - there are plenty more examples of Sino-Russian competition to select from as the Global South plays an increasingly critical role in international relations. And as trade and foreign policy become increasingly required in an increasingly complex world, we may find ourselves facing a new Sino-Russian Split in the 21st century.
TAI Score: Degree 3. While a Sino-Russian partnership is not an enormous threat in itself, the challenges posed to the US-led world order are causing points of tension for major powers in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and many areas across Asia. This score may be upgraded, however, in the wake of a Sino-Russian diplomatic falling out, given the unpredictable nature of the outcome.
