Political Science’s Greatest Debate
The 20th century is arguably the most radical period of change in human history.
In the space of a single lifetime, humans went from testing out the first aeroplane prototype in 1903, to landing on the moon in 1969. Escalators, radios, neon lights, teddy bears, teabags, stainless steel, and cellophane were all invented before 1920 alone, and the world of international politics was no less active. In the year 1940, effectively all forms of government along the mainstream political spectrum (democracy, fascism, and communism) were active somewhere in the world. Entire empires experienced both their rise and fall inside of this century, and de-colonisation took place almost entirely before the year 1999.
There’s no doubt that the 20th century was absolutely pivotal - especially with its recency guaranteeing ease of access to information. So why, then, is there still one question that we can’t answer?
Does democracy create economic development, or is it the other way around?
The laissez-faire approach is fairly easy for most people to understand: better freedoms in politics, market choices, and general way of life allows people to make choices that they feel suit them the best, thus allowing for growth in nearly every sector. A University of Chicago study found that countries that shifted from authoritarianism to democracy experienced, in the long run, a staggering 20% growth in GDP per capita. A further article from the European Journal of Political Economy combined 188 studies across a 36-year period, finding that while human capital was the major driving force of economic development, “democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias”.
The results also speak for themselves. The GDP per capita in several post-Soviet states shows an undeniably positive trend: the figures have grown by approximately USD $8,000 in Armenia, USD $12,000 in Kazakhstan, and USD $20,000 in Poland. Looking to the non-formerly communist world, Taiwan’s average GDP per capita began to take off after the military-aligned government loosened restrictions and ended the White Terror in 1987, Indonesia’s has risen approximately ten-fold since Suharto’s resignation, and the average person in Portugal experienced real economic growth less than ten years after implementing a democratic constitution following 43 years of dictatorship.
But if democracy creates economic growth, why then has GDP per capita remained low in democracies like Nigeria, India, and Kenya? Common trends across impoverished democracies include corruption, a lack of economic diversification, a lack of investment into education systems, and more.
Looking at the other side of the debate, which claims that economic development ushers in democracy, the case studies lean heavily towards three of the four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, with the exception being aforementioned Taiwan). Although Hong Kong has never been fully democratic, and Singapore’s status is up for debate, their cases alongside South Korea - which only became liberally democratic as recently as 1987 - show that shifts towards democracy are possible even under economic development led by authoritarianism.
But if economic growth creates democracy, why do countries like Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China remain authoritarian? Single-party systems often point to economic development as a justification for their existence under the status quo. Since Putin’s leadership began in the late 1990s, the Russian GDP per capita has risen by USD $14,000, and China’s Communist Party has eradicated enormous amounts of domestic poverty in the last century.
This debate will likely continue for the foreseeable future in socio-economic and socio-political circles. With both democratic trends and economic matters being extraordinarily multi-dimensional, tracking the causes and effects of outcomes is an exceptional undertaking, and a one-size-fits-all approach is rarely appropriate - or even feasible.
TAI Score: Degree 2. Curiously, the debate itself holds no more importance than its component parts: economic development and democratisation. While the two are inseparable, and should be promoted where possible, a downturn in one may cause a similar effect in the other. Thus, rather than arguing which acts as the cause and which as the effect, we should accept that the true threat is neglecting either one.