The Other Separatists
At the time of writing this article, it’s nearly the end of 2022. For many of us, it’s likely the first year that COVID-19 hasn’t dominated every media outlet’s headlines every month, mainly due to it being overtaken by more major stories: looming economic turmoil, protests in Iran, Indonesia, and Peru (to name but a few), colossal flooding in Pakistan, and the death of Queen Elizabeth II. However, it feels as if by far the most reported-on news story in the West has been the now 10-month old Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has received a colossal amount of scrutiny and analysis over the course of the year.
It isn’t, however, the first time Russia conducted an invasion of a neighbour in recent memory. In fact, it isn’t even Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in recent memory. Three breakaway states (not including Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine), maintaining minimal (if any) international recognition, exist in eastern Europe and the Caucasus as direct outcomes of Soviet collapse.
Transnistria
Credit: BBC News
Located near the Ukrainian border in eastern Moldova, Transnistria is a separatist region diplomatically unrecognised by every country in the world. It is, however, supported by Russia economically, politically, and militarily, with about 1500 Russian troops stationed there, though many of them are ethnic Russians, born and raised in Transnistria, who have been provided Russian passports. Despite no country recognising the territory as independent, the Moldovan government is unable to exercise any authority over the region and its nearly 500,000 people, rendering it a functionally separate state. Russia’s interests in this sliver of land are largely political. In recent decades, Moldova has taken on an increasingly pro-Western stance away from Moscow, and by maintaining troops in Transnistria, Russia could quickly eliminate Moldovan EU membership ambitions by destabilising the country. By simultaneously not recognising the breakaway state, however, Russian options remain flexible.
South Ossetia
Europe’s first 21st century war erupted on August 8, 2008, with the Russian invasion of Georgia. The origins of this conflict can be traced back to Georgia’s brief civil war with two separatist states following the dissolution of the USSR. Tensions simmered for nearly two decades until then-president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, responded to clashes in the region by ordering troops to capture Ossetia’s regional capital. Russia’s response to the Georgian crackdown was fast, but brief: Russian troops were deployed to Georgia to defend the breakaway province, fighting for only five days but guaranteeing greater levels of self-governance for the separatists. Today, only Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru recognise South Ossetia as an independent republic.
Abkhazia
Credit: Radio Free Europe
The other separatist state located between Georgia and Russia is that of Abkhazia. Entering a geopolitical quagmire through, and during, the same conflict as South Ossetia above, Abkhazia represents the other half of Russian occupation in formerly Georgian territory. The Abkhaz, however, are different from Ossetians in that they fear the erosion of their language and cultural identity, a trend that can be identified through tensions over sovereignty issues in even the Russo-Abkhaz relationship. The same list of countries that recognise South Ossetia also recognise Abkhazia.
Why do these issues matter?
Aside from killing hundreds of Georgians and Russians and injuring thousands more, the war in 2008 is significant due to its almost uncanny (if significantly scaled-down) similarity to ongoing hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Lessons learnt from the conclusion of the 2008 crisis would be useful for any security analyst to draw upon for the implementation of policy and law for when this year’s conflict eventually concludes. For now, however, these conflicts - whose origins lie in the early 1990s - in Georgia and Ukraine ultimately validate the point made by Foreign Policy magazine and Franak Viacorka from the Atlantic Council: the Soviet Union may be gone, but here at the end of 2022, it is still collapsing.
TAI Score: Degree 3. These separatist movements have potential for renewed armed conflict in their respective countries. Trends similar to their experiences and outcomes are already manifesting in eastern Ukraine, and are crippling nations with otherwise high potential. They certainly hold capability to destabilise European nations by creating refugee crises and threatening supply lines. Risk assesors should monitor these respective situations and work towards bespoke solutions - as a “one-size-fits-all” approach is rarely appropriate in international security.
