The US-Europe Defence Divide
It’s an exceptionally strange time to be half British, half American. The two countries seem to be drifting apart, less than ten years after the UK declared its intention to leave the European Union. As I write these words, I have a very strange sense of limbo - caught between three varying senses of loyalty (the US, the UK, and the EU), while being entirely unable to fit into any single one.
Maybe, for that reason, it’s the perfect opportunity for me to take a look at the two sides of the ongoing US-Europe defence disagreement. I should point out that I don’t fully associate with one argument over the other - again, how could I?
The US Perspective
Since as far back as at least the Clinton administration - which ended in 2001 - every US President (including Clinton himself) who occupied the Oval Office lamented that not enough NATO allies were paying their fair share. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only 8 out of the 29 countries* in the organisation met the commitment of spending 2% of national GDP on defence. Even two years after Ukraine was attacked in 2022, 8 countries still did not meet their spending commitment despite enjoying all of the benefits that come with membership.
If you ask an American, they’ll probably tell you its no surprise that so many European countries have spare finances for strong welfare states - their militaries are halfway paid for by Washington DC, and have been for decades.
Of course, it was deeply unsettling to see President Trump state that he’d “encourage Russia to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members that are still not meeting their commitment. But now, with Trump actually in the White House, European countries are calling for greater defence at home - France is discussing a domestic nuclear weapons umbrella with Germany, previously neutral Sweden and Finland have joined NATO and immediately met their spending commitment, and stocks for European defence contractors are soaring amid anticipation of more large orders for Ukraine.
In true Trump fashion, there were far more smooth, diplomatic ways to handle the situation. And while there has been a diplomatic speed bump across the Atlantic, there’s no doubt that most (if not all) of Europe is bolstering domestic defence by paying its fair share - which is all the US is asking for. Besides, every other country outside of NATO pays for their own militaries already - if Uganda, Paraguay, and Timor-Leste can pay for their defence, then Spain and Canada can too.
The Trump administration also clearly wants to end the war in Ukraine - and ending a war is surely a good thing, isn’t it?
The European Perspective
Alarm bells have likely been ringing nonstop in Brussels since November 2024. Trump, who is widely suspected of having personal ties to Russia, the exact country attacking Europe, a relative stone’s throw from NATO’s frontlines in Poland and Romania.
To Europe, Washington’s willingness to pause aid and intelligence to Kyiv after a disastrous argument between Trump and Zelenskyy in early March signaled the worst, short term nightmare for the European security landscape: that the US could not only no longer be relied on for defence anymore, but that nobody could - the only realistic alternatives are China, which isn’t anywhere near Europe, or Russia, which is exactly whom the EU and NATO hope to defend themselves against.
As for ending the war in Ukraine - the terms are barely in anyone’s interests besides Washington and Moscow’s. The peace plan’s details were not even revealed at the 2025 Munich Security Conference in February, with negotiations bypassing the EU and Ukraine entirely - in fact, a Ukrainian delegation was not even invited to the first few conferences. It certainly doesn’t help, either, that Europe has a legacy of appeasing dictators, only to have them continue seizing land. One of the greatest reasons that Hitler was able to continue conquering is that land was, quite simply, handed over to him - the devastation of WWI meant that so many countries were unwilling to engage in another European land war, so the territory was simply relinquished with minimal protest.
Europe is, therefore, terrified that the continent’s future will be determined by two powers - one hostile, the other foreign (and, debatably, increasingly hostile as well).
TAI Score: Degree 4. While the situation is undoubtedly tense, there may be some benefit in the short term over a 30-day ceasefire and possible end to the war in Ukraine. In the longer term, however, a rift between Europe and the US would create more problems than it solves - with China and Russia likely to reap the greatest benefits.
*The eight countries were (in order from highest to lowest) Greece, the US, Poland, the UK, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.