High Stakes, Low Tech: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute
The city of Itanagar, in the southwestern part of Arunachal Pradesh, is home to approximately 80,000 people. Located in the Himalayan foothills approximately 150 kilometers east of Bhutan, the surrounding area is famous for its Buddhist sites of historical significance, medieval forts, and even outdoor adventure opportunities across the high-altitude landscape.
Sadly, Arunachal Pradesh - and other areas along India’s northern, Himalayan frontier - is also home to one of the world’s most tense, complex, and under-reported border disputes. Yet, it manifests itself in one of the most unusual ways: skirmishes between India and China that consist not of firearms, but of fists and blunt weaponry.
The source of tension comes from a poorly defined border stretching approximately 3500km, roughly the same length as the US-Mexico border, along the geographically-hostile Himalayan mountains, and is commonly referred to as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The LAC includes not only Arunachal Pradesh, but stretches further west towards Aksai Chin, near India’s border with Pakistan and the disputed Kashmir territory as well. The map to the right shows that in reality, given the lack of conflict over borders between China, Nepal, and Bhutan, an overwhelming majority of India’s northern border with China is quite poorly defined.
So why fight with blunt weapons, rather than through more contemporary and conventional means?
According to The Economist, a conscientious desire to avoid open conflict and wide-scale bloodshed has led to an agreement between both China and India to prohibit the use of firearms, explosives, or other means of modern warfare to establish a claim along the LAC. This is based on a 1996 agreement that limits or bans the use of combat tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, the flight of military aircraft inside a 10km radius from the LAC without prior notification, and more.
The agreement, however, appears fragile at best, and violence frequently erupts over the construction of “dual-use” infrastructure (which can be easily converted from civilian to military use) along the LAC. In June 2020, four Chinese soldiers and nearly two dozen Indian soldiers were killed in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, near Aksai Chin, after facing off with Chinese forces for over a month. Tensions in this particular instance were sparked over the Indian construction of a road leading to an airfield in spite of Chinese protests. Similarly, Chinese infrastructure developments linking Tibet with northern and eastern China via air, road, and railway have sparked considerable concerns in India, given the now-bolstered capability to quickly move large amounts of Chinese troops from across the country towards the Himalayan border.
Thankfully, it has been several years since violent clashes broke out along the Sino-Indian border, and diplomatic discussions (though fruitless thus far) remain a relied-upon resource for both sides. Nonetheless, the situation remains tense and politicised. In late 2023, a map published by the Chinese government showed all disputed territories as part of China, to which the response to Indian outrage was simply: “Stay calm.”.
TAI Score: Degree 3. A more assertive foreign policy stance has emerged under the presidency of Xi Jinping, but spectators have commented that India and China have “too much to lose” by entering armed conflict over the disputed territories. SimpleNation further builds on this line of thought by stating that not only do both sides have much to lose, but also little to gain: the relatively inhospitable geographies of the territories in question offers little to either country, both of which boast already enormous diversity of biomes, robust economic output, and a population of over 1 billion people each. Though a victory for either side would be a significant political and symbolic win, the costs are far too high. Thus, while the situation requires constant monitoring to prevent a disaster, it is not likely to do so at this time.