The Modern Warsaw Pact
Formed during the midst of the Cold War’s early years, the Warsaw Pact was a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European states. It was established in 1955 as a counter-balance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that had been implemented six years prior, and was led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, Russia. In addition to the USSR, the Warsaw Pact included Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia (now the two separate countries of Czechia and Slovakia). For those curious, a the founding charter of the Warsaw Pact can be found here.
As one might expect, the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, mere months before the wholesale end to the Soviet Union. Not long after, however, a new, less well-known alliance arose in its place.
CSTO leaders meet in the Kremlin. Source: Office of the President of the Russian Federation
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (henceforth, and more commonly, referred to as the CSTO) was founded in 2002, based on a treaty from ten years prior. According to Nikolai Bordyuzha from the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) in Germany, the priority goals of the CSTO are “to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability, and to defend on a collective basis the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of member states.”.
Much like the Warsaw Pact, the CSTO is led from Moscow, though its membership has largely shifted from eastern Europe to Central Asia, now including Russia, Belarus, Armenia*, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Most recently, the CSTO made headlines during its intervention in Kazakhstan during civil unrest in January of 2022 - Kazakhstan’s president (falsely) claimed that “threats from outside” existed, thus justifying a request for CSTO troops to restore order. The organisation’s intervention, however, was largely symbolic: most of the troops came from Russia to protect major infrastructure and strategic national assets such as airports and government buildings, rather than actively suppressing protests. Upon their departure, the CSTO declared the operation “a success”.
Critics of the CSTO, naturally, do not agree with this assessment. Finabel, the European Land Force Commanders Organisation, identifies that CSTO members are looking elsewhere for security guarantees - namely, China. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation in Germany further asserts that Moscow “does not have the resources [or willpower] to turn the CSTO into a manageable instrument to support its political ambitions.”. The American Georgetown Journal of International Affairs has even gone so far as to refer to it as a “Shambling, lifeless alliance”.
Whatever the case may be - it appears that at face value, the CSTO is either not designed to be, or not capable of being, a counterweight to NATO. But it may still serve as an excellent example for Russia’s desire to maintain a sphere of influence and hegemony in the former Soviet Union - even outside of Europe.
*At the time of writing this article, Armenia is making headlines for declaring its departure from the CSTO.
TAI Score: Degree 2. While the phenomenon of Russia’s ongoing desire for influence in the former Soviet world poses significant security risks, particularly in eastern Europe, the CSTO itself is likely not a significant threat to outside actors. A lack of active participation in suppressing Kazakh protests, combined with the loss of Armenia as a member, signify the the organisation likely lacks the strength it needs to carry out its - or Moscow’s - objectives.
