Why There’s No Asian NATO
On the 27th of September, Japan’s next Prime Minister was identified. Shigeru Ishiba, who has launched a campaign for the role on four previous occasions, will take over from Fumio Kishida following his resignation after a number of corruption scandals plagued the Liberal Democratic party - which has dominated Japanese politics for decades. Ishiba is Japan’s former defence minister, and has earned a number of enemies from within his own party for proposing ideas like a more balanced defence relationship with the USA, including the creation of an Asian equivalent to NATO.
Which begs the question: why isn’t there one already?
The original NATO was, according to their site’s history page, founded for three reasons: deterrence against the Soviets, using a North American military presence to prevent fascism in Europe after WWII, and encouraging political integration among European states. The founding members shared a common history and mostly common geography - they were western European countries that had, by the end of the war, cooperated in varying capacities to defeat Germany.
The East Asian story is, by most accounts, entirely different - for three key reasons.
The Mutual Relations Factor
Although regional powers were united against Japan after WWII, those same countries found themselves fighting their own internal battles against communism in a way that European countries did not. Korea was split in half along ideological lines, the nationalist government of China had completely retreated to Taiwan, and communism slowly flourished in Vietnam before completely taking over the country. Only Japan did not face these struggles - because its political reconstruction was directly led by the US. On top of that, these countries still largely harboured animosity towards Japan due to the horrific war crimes it carried out during the conflict that took place barely 20 years prior. Thus, in order to maximise influence over (and act as an intermediary between) these countries, the US created a “hub and spoke” system that guaranteed each country had relations with the US - but not necessarily one another.
The China Factor
There are already NATO-like structures present in Asia-Pacific. The QUAD alliance consisting of the US, Japan, Australia, and India is an informal maritime security organisation that arose out of the recovery efforts following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. AUKUS (Australia, the UK, and the US) routinely showcases its advancements towards cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, with its flagship achievement to date including the provision of submarines powered by nuclear fuel to the Australian Royal Navy. Both alliances are largely informal, and neither include more than four members. And yet, both the QUAD and AUKUS have been sharply criticised by China - whose influence the two alliances seeks to contain. The creation of an Asian NATO, therefore, would undoubtedly sound alarm bells in Beijing, where the other two alliances are already unpopular. Its creation would serve as a justification for a more assertive Chinese foreign policy in order to combat what it sees as its “containment”.
The Neutrality Factor
Looking beyond China, East and Southeast Asia is full of countries that, quite simply, do not want to get caught up in these types of rivalries. Vietnam, for example, proudly upholds its “Four No’s” foreign policy approach, which prohibits 1) joining any military alliance, 2) taking sides in disputes, 3) having foreign military bases or activity in its borders, and 4) using force in international policy. Indonesia does not currently seek to be bound to any global power or military pact, nor does the official ASEAN bloc. The political will simply isn’t there - even if Japan, South Korea, and the US created a new trilateral agreement - it would be difficult to find a focus point. Put simply: South Korea likely doesn’t have a vested interest in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.
TAI Score: Degree 3. The creation of an Asian NATO is likely to create more problems than it solves by creating a sense of panic in China. Even if a mutual guarantee of defence is established in the event of a conflict, it would likely trigger conflict if somewhere like Taiwan - where the pact would be most important - were to join. For countries like Japan, Vietnam, or South Korea, its implementation might ward off outward Chinese aggression, but may cause a rise in internal issues such as cyber attacks and the proliferation of organised crime.