The Western World’s Most Sensitive Ladder
The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is arguably the most sacred site in Christianity. Located in Jerusalem, it is believed to be the site of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion and tomb, and has served as a site for pilgrims for approximately 1500 years. It is further understood to be jointly governed by six different Christian denominations, while officially existing in the Jewish state of Israel, leading to a somewhat tangled series of “ownerships”.
This is where our story begins today.
The early days of Christianity witnessed extreme, and often violent, splintering into different sects, including Greek, Armenian, Ethiopian, and other separate groups* seeking control of the Holy Land. This continued for centuries even after the withdrawal of the Romans, until Islamic Arabian and Ottoman forces occupied the area beginning in the 7th century, suppressing all religious minorities.
The Ottomans did, however, issue a decree regarding the factions rallying for control over the church, passing a “Status Quo” law in the 1750s which ordered that no changes could be made to the site without the explicit permission of all six denominations expressing approval. This law extends not only to the building and its land, but also candles, chairs, furniture, windows, and anything inside or outside.
This includes the ladder.
The ladder itself is believed to have been placed there no later than the 1720s - its first mention appears in an engraving and although little else is known about its origins, we do know that it falls under the status quo arrangement as part of the Church. Rumors about the ladder include that it was left behind by a stone mason whose name and status have been lost to time. Other postulate that it was used when the Ottomans restricted movement in and out of the church so the monks could receive sunlight, or that it was used to grow vegetables on a balcony.
And yet, despite the ladder’s “sacred” status as a part of the church, it has been moved before - once to allow renovation crews to continue work on the bell tower, and another time after a thief stole it, before returning it after learning that its disappearance was creating conflict between the Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches.
This may sound like a joke - but fights have indeed broken out over the contents of the church being altered without the aforementioned six-way permission. As recently as 2008, a Coptic monk - of which there is always at least one present on a small section of the roof in dispute with the Ethiopian church - shifted his chair 20 centimeters to the side in order to sit in the shade.
The resulting clash resulted in the hospitalisation of eleven people.
TAI Score: Degree 1. It is highly unlikely that the contents of a church will cause any significant geopolitical threat. Regardless, given the violence that has potential to break out over such minor alterations means that individuals visiting the site should be aware - particularly considering the already high level of religious and sectarian violence that exists in the Middle East.
*The full list of denominations is the Greek, Armenian, Ethiopian, Syriac, Coptic Egyptian, and Roman Catholic churches.
Limitless, Until It Isn’t
Two years ago, during the Winter Olympics, China’s Xi and Russia’s Putin declared a “no limits partnership” with manifestoes designed to counter American influence throughout the world.
It’s not the first time this has happened - unsurprisingly, during the Cold War, Mao’s China and Stalin’s USSR formed a positive relationship less than a year after the communists’ victory in the Chinese Civil War, with Mao declaring that China would “lean to one side, ally with the Soviet Union, and form an international united front.” . Such a united front led to the Korean War, as a conflict, expanding far beyond the Korean Peninsula, pulling in forces from all over the globe on both sides. This trend existed throughout the early years of the Cold War, until Moscow and Beijing began to drift apart - conflicts of national strategic interest and debates over ideology (to name but a few) include reasons for what a casual observer may consider to otherwise be a natural alliance between Maoist China and the USSR.
It might not be the last time this falling out happens, either. Experts are already wondering just how limitless the “limitless partnership” announced in 2022 really is.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Russian geopolitical potential greatly withdrew. It had lost direct influence in eastern Europe and central Asia, its GDP was shrinking by a staggering 14% in 1992, and Russia itself had nearly witnessed a new civil war in 1993. Around the same time, the China had entered a series of almost perfectly opposite trends: the GDP was growing by 14%, the political situation remained stable even after the Tiananmen Square Incident, and its borders remained unchanged since 1949. Nevertheless, China needed (and indeed, still needs) oil and natural gas - thus, since Russia had fuel but needed money - and China had money but needed fuel, a Sino-Russian trade relationship was natural. As of 2025, the Power of Siberia pipeline is expected to export approximately 38 billion cubic meters (BCM) of liquified natural gas to China, its peak capacity. At the same time, the recently-announced Power of Siberia 2 pipeline would expand Russian fuel exports to China by a further 50 BCM.
However, the project has hit a number of obstacles. Mongolia (through which the pipeline runs) cancelling its participation, combined with China’s lack of commitment to the Power of Siberia 2 project, demands for low prices, and significant progress in renewable energy production have all contributed to a stalling of the pipeline’s implementation. Even if the project were to be finished and in operation, however, the 88 BCM of gas exported to China would fall far short of the 337.5 BCM of natural gas imported by the EU from Russia in 2021 alone.
Lastly, indirect competition between Russia and China lingers in a number of key locations - especially central Asia, given its geographic location as neighbours to both Russia and China. The Eurasian Research Institute (using data from SIPRI, the international arms export tracker) has announced that the defence economics trend “is most clearly visible in the decline of Russian economic dominance in Central Asia in favour of China, as Russian trade that in the 1990s amounted to USD $110 billion and made up 80% of the region’s trade dropped now to 18.6 billion USD, which is well behind that of China”. This will be especially true in areas outside of weapons exports, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative places a heavy emphasis on central Asian nations.
The story is not particularly different in the Arctic - where the presence of Russian influence is both powerful and entirely justifiable due to geography, although the country sees it as a “privileged sphere of influence”. But as the Arctic becomes globalised due to new, shorter trade routes opening up as a result of climate change, and the extraction of enormous oil and gas deposits there, the area has real risk of becoming a point of tension between fuel-dependent Russia and export-dependent China.
Turning towards foreign policy, one of the previously mentioned reasons for the collapse in the Sino-Soviet relationship of the Cold War was that of national strategic interest. More specifically, this refers to a lack of consensus over which of the two communist giants - China, or the Soviet Union - would take on the responsibility of leading both the communist world and spreading revolutions in the Global South.
As far as 21st century foreign policy goes, we are absolutely watching history repeat itself: in addition to aforementioned competition over Central Asia and the Arctic, Russian mercenaries guarantee security in northern Africa while local countries like Mali join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Russia has grown closer to Hamas in Gaza while China builds networks aiming to strengthen Palestinian governance, and - perhaps most significantly - China was noticeably quiet and reportedly displeased when Russia deepened its ties with North Korea. Serbian ties with Beijing and Moscow have both been considerably strengthened in recent years, while the same pattern has also emerged in Pakistan (who recently signed on for closer defence ties with Russia, and economic ties with China) and Venezuela (where both Russia and China have congratulated Maduro on his questionable election victory).
These examples are to name but a few countries - there are plenty more examples of Sino-Russian competition to select from as the Global South plays an increasingly critical role in international relations. And as trade and foreign policy become increasingly required in an increasingly complex world, we may find ourselves facing a new Sino-Russian Split in the 21st century.
TAI Score: Degree 3. While a Sino-Russian partnership is not an enormous threat in itself, the challenges posed to the US-led world order are causing points of tension for major powers in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and many areas across Asia. This score may be upgraded, however, in the wake of a Sino-Russian diplomatic falling out, given the unpredictable nature of the outcome.
The Unification Church
Japan is, by nearly every metric, routinely ranked as one of the safest countries in the world.
Despite a population of 125 million, the country reported a mere 289 homicides in 2022 - for comparison, the UK reported 581 - approximately twice as many incidents, despite approximately one-half the population size. Even Canada, a country whose population is comparable to just Japan’s capital city, reported nearly 900 homicides. It’s no wonder, then, that Japan is ranked as the 9th safest country on Earth - despite far outsizing every other country on the top 15 list in terms of population.
It’s also no wonder, then, that the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, enormously shocked the entire world. Both Japanese and foreign observers quickly began asking questions: how did Japanese security forces allow this to happen? How did the killer even get ahold of a firearm? Who is he, and what is his motive? The answer to that final question is the focus of today’s article - and it isn’t, by any means, a straightforward one. It begins not in Japan - but neighbouring South Korea.
In 1954, a man by the name of Sun Myung Moon - an avowed evangelical Christian and passionate opponent of communism - founded the Unification Church: an organisation which he led after claiming God had spoken to and ordered him to create a Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. Since its founding, the Church has been accused of brainwashing members, holding non-mainstream views on issues such as same-sex marriage or reproductive rights, and operating as a cult to enrich its top leadership. It still exists today - holding mass wedding ceremonies and even running the Washington Times newspaper, which is not believed to be a credible source of journalistic information (nor is it to be confused with the American mainstream Washington Post and New York Times newspapers).
But how did a Korean neo-Christian cult become linked to the assassination of a Japanese former Prime Minister?
As implied given its ownership of an American newspaper, the Church’s presence is not limited to South Korea, and has a following in Japan of approximately 100,000 individuals (though this is a figure according to a spokesperson from the Church, and may be higher in reality). Tetsuya Yamagami - Abe’s assassin - believed that his family had been ruined by his mother’s donation to the Church that pushed them into deep poverty. Abe’s party, the Liberal Democrats that have dominated Japanese politics since the mid-1950s, does have known ties to the Unification Church.
Yamagami, therefore, sought revenge on a Prime Minister with links to the cult for pushing his family into a desperate financial situation.
Aside from the obvious - the presence of a cult in a major power’s mainstream politics - the situation shows another unusual trend. East Asian security is rarely defined by non-state actors. The Kuril Islands, nuclear weaponry proliferation, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and South China Sea dispute all consist of exclusively country-based actors, and other parties rarely - if ever - become introduced. The situation with the Unification Church, however, directly defies this trend, creating an uncommon occurrence with a barely predictable outcome.
TAI Score: Degree 2. It’s unlikely that the Unification Church will lead to heightened geopolitical risk in the Asia-Pacific region or beyond. But with outcomes such as the assassination of Shinzo Abe, its presence and operations should be monitored by both local and overseas actors for issues surrounding business risk, particularly given Moon’s incarceration in the United States for tax evasion. While political risk is minimised, business risk may not necessarily be absent.
How To Be a Spy From Your Couch
Did you know that it’s possible to live out your childhood dream of being a Hollywood-style intelligence expert from the comfort of your home, local library, or a coffee shop - without having to put your life on the line in a 007-style gunfight?
Open-source intelligence, colloquially known as OSINT, might sound complex and clandestine in nature - but it’s probably one of the easiest skills to learn, and you’ve probably used it before without even recognising it. Officially defined as “intelligence produced by collecting and analyzing public information with the purpose of answering a specific intelligence question”, a more SimpleNation-esque description of the skill would be “using readily-available resources online to find an answer to something - even if it isn’t immediately obvious.”.
You might be thinking “That’s easy - I use Google all the time!”. But OSINT can be a skill used by certified professionals - ranging from journalists to national security experts - deploying a whole toolbox of methodologies. Thankfully, however, you don’t need to work for the SIS or CIA to get involved.
Since OSINT relies on readily-available tools, platforms like Google Earth and Twitter can, in certain contexts, become tools for gathering intelligence. Bellingcat, a leading investigations firm based in the Netherlands, has a wealth of case studies that include using tools like social media, satellite imagery, and declassified court documents to gather information on critical topics - up to and including the tracking of ingredients used to create an illegal chemical weapon. You can even use sites like Windy.com to track live weather updates and tap into street cameras around the world - legally.
When airstrikes in Yemen against Houthi rebels took place, I used OSINT techniques to get ahead of the news cycle and find out exactly where, when, and against which targets the US Air Force and British RAF had launched attacks. The file is available upon request*, and was created in less than an hour using only Twitter and a media bias checker to find out which information could be trusted - and which could not. I also used Google Earth in my Master’s degree dissertation - measuring the lengths of airport runways that were officially built for infrastructure investment, but I suspected were secretly built for the additional purpose of carrying out military exercises.
So, what separates OSINT from simply using Google, flight and maritime trackers, and social media?
On the surface, the use of open-source information may be the same, but the difference between information and intelligence comes from intent, and the proper cataloguing of data to fulfill that intent. The correct processing of information to answer questions like who, what, when, where, why, and how to provide a comprehensive response to an issue is what separates OSINT from simply using the search bar on Instagram. In other words, information is collected, intelligence is produced - thus making the information actionable.
Want to get started learning more about OSINT? The Basel Institute (EU-based) and Kapsuun Group (USA-based) provide excellent, interactive, and free-of-charge courses in OSINT that each take approximately two hours to complete and provide digital certificates. Their links, as well as a toolbox for OSINT-related search framework, are provided below.
OSINT Toolbox and OSINT Essentials
TAI Score: Degree 0. OSINT itself is not a threat to international security, is legal for private citizens to learn and use, and - if anything - can prevent conflict if used properly by the right sources.
*Please reach out to me at btait.simplenation@gmail.com for access to the file.
The World’s (Currently) Most Critical Chokepoint
We’ve been hearing about supply chain issues since COVID-19 forced much of the world indoors for approximately two years.
Even after the pandemic ended, these issues persisted around the world. Shifts in labour availability combined with a spike in demand for goods where supply has not able to keep up is leading to empty shelves in the supermarket, and higher prices at the petrol pump. This hasn’t been helped by the geopolitical strains faced in eastern Europe and the Middle East, either. While they’ve largely settled now, food prices soared in the initial aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine due to chaos in the Black Sea and Europe’s most agriculturally productive area.
The other critical area for international supply lines - specifically fossil fuels - currently looks increasingly unstable.
The Strait of Hormuz is, on average, only about 35 miles wide. It sits at the end of the Persian Gulf, a waterway stretching from Kuwait, past Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman before entering the Arabian Sea. Most importantly, however, the entire Gulf - Strait of Hormuz included - runs along the entire southern edge of Iran.
The Gulf states - which get their moniker from the Persian Gulf - are wealthy in two things: oil, and finances generated from the sales of oil. In fact, six* out of the top 20 exporters of oil directly border the Gulf, with the seventh (Oman) just behind in 21st. Each day, the Strait of Hormuz exports an astonishing USD $1.2 billion worth of oil per day - an amount which the American Energy Information Administration estimates equated to approximately one-fifth of all global liquid petroleum consumption (of which oil is merely a component).
But if this area has been the backbone of international oil trade for years, why is it only now coming into the spotlight?
Tensions in the Middle East, at the time of writing this article, are extraordinarily high. The aftermath of the October 7th attacks in Israel have undone years of diplomacy as militia groups in Palestine, Yemen, and southern Lebanon have become more active and violent than at any point in the past decade. These groups do not share geography, but they do share backing from Iran - the country with the longest coastline along the Persian Gulf.
If a major conflict breaks out in the Middle East - which currently seems well within possibility - an Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will cause oil prices to skyrocket.
A spike in oil prices will, of course, not affect only the Middle East - though the impact will certainly be felt there. The knock-on implications will be truly global. Higher oil prices will certainly benefit the Russian economy, which has already generated nearly USD $800 billion after becoming the most heavily sanctioned country in the world after invading Ukraine. Higher oil prices will only cause that figure to grow higher, faster - placing even greater strains on the current situation in Ukraine. The spike in oil prices will also be felt in India and China, which imported 40% and 75% of their fossil fuel supplies in 2022, respectively. Although great efforts towards better renewable energy production are being taken in both India and China, the transition in either country is far from complete and a reliance on fossil fuels remains the norm.
Thus, while the COVID-19 pandemic may seem like a distant memory, we may not be out of the woods regarding supply chain issues yet - and the worst may be yet to come. This is, of course, only looking at a crucial, but single, shipping lane as well - the human, environmental, and infrastructure cost of a major conflict across the Middle East is barely calculable - and almost unimaginable.
TAI Score: Degree 5. All eyes are currently on Iranian proxies and how the situation in the Middle East will unfold. The current risk to the international economy - let alone local human security in the region - is extraordinary. If they are not already implemented, decision makers and business leaders must have a plan for adapting to the possibility of severe conflict as soon as possible. Leading news outlets are referring to the region as being “on the brink” - all parties involved must proceed with caution, and rely on reputable intelligence to move forward.
*Those six countries are, in order from highest to lowest, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar.
Political Science’s Greatest Debate
The 20th century is arguably the most radical period of change in human history.
In the space of a single lifetime, humans went from testing out the first aeroplane prototype in 1903, to landing on the moon in 1969. Escalators, radios, neon lights, teddy bears, teabags, stainless steel, and cellophane were all invented before 1920 alone, and the world of international politics was no less active. In the year 1940, effectively all forms of government along the mainstream political spectrum (democracy, fascism, and communism) were active somewhere in the world. Entire empires experienced both their rise and fall inside of this century, and de-colonisation took place almost entirely before the year 1999.
There’s no doubt that the 20th century was absolutely pivotal - especially with its recency guaranteeing ease of access to information. So why, then, is there still one question that we can’t answer?
Does democracy create economic development, or is it the other way around?
The laissez-faire approach is fairly easy for most people to understand: better freedoms in politics, market choices, and general way of life allows people to make choices that they feel suit them the best, thus allowing for growth in nearly every sector. A University of Chicago study found that countries that shifted from authoritarianism to democracy experienced, in the long run, a staggering 20% growth in GDP per capita. A further article from the European Journal of Political Economy combined 188 studies across a 36-year period, finding that while human capital was the major driving force of economic development, “democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias”.
The results also speak for themselves. The GDP per capita in several post-Soviet states shows an undeniably positive trend: the figures have grown by approximately USD $8,000 in Armenia, USD $12,000 in Kazakhstan, and USD $20,000 in Poland. Looking to the non-formerly communist world, Taiwan’s average GDP per capita began to take off after the military-aligned government loosened restrictions and ended the White Terror in 1987, Indonesia’s has risen approximately ten-fold since Suharto’s resignation, and the average person in Portugal experienced real economic growth less than ten years after implementing a democratic constitution following 43 years of dictatorship.
But if democracy creates economic growth, why then has GDP per capita remained low in democracies like Nigeria, India, and Kenya? Common trends across impoverished democracies include corruption, a lack of economic diversification, a lack of investment into education systems, and more.
Looking at the other side of the debate, which claims that economic development ushers in democracy, the case studies lean heavily towards three of the four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, with the exception being aforementioned Taiwan). Although Hong Kong has never been fully democratic, and Singapore’s status is up for debate, their cases alongside South Korea - which only became liberally democratic as recently as 1987 - show that shifts towards democracy are possible even under economic development led by authoritarianism.
But if economic growth creates democracy, why do countries like Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China remain authoritarian? Single-party systems often point to economic development as a justification for their existence under the status quo. Since Putin’s leadership began in the late 1990s, the Russian GDP per capita has risen by USD $14,000, and China’s Communist Party has eradicated enormous amounts of domestic poverty in the last century.
This debate will likely continue for the foreseeable future in socio-economic and socio-political circles. With both democratic trends and economic matters being extraordinarily multi-dimensional, tracking the causes and effects of outcomes is an exceptional undertaking, and a one-size-fits-all approach is rarely appropriate - or even feasible.
TAI Score: Degree 2. Curiously, the debate itself holds no more importance than its component parts: economic development and democratisation. While the two are inseparable, and should be promoted where possible, a downturn in one may cause a similar effect in the other. Thus, rather than arguing which acts as the cause and which as the effect, we should accept that the true threat is neglecting either one.
Do Sanctions Work?
If you’re an expert in international economics, you’ll know that the answer to the above question is not particularly straightforward. The word itself is somewhat confusing, because it has two opposite definitions: “an official, formal, or legal permission to do something”, and “a punishment given when people do not obey a rule or law”. Today, SimpleNation takes a closer look at the latter definition in international politics, and asks whether this is an effective method of upholding a rules-based international order.
The list of countries financially sanctioned by the UK for a variety of reasons includes North Korea, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, and more. Reasons for their presence on this list include human rights violations, terrorism-related activities, and illegal exploitation of natural resources. Regulations are imposed unilaterally by the UK’s government, but as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK is automatically obligated to uphold sanctions made by this body as well. We also hear about high-level targeted sanctions made on individuals in governments deemed hostile or national security threats to the origin country. The United States has quite openly sanctioned senior officials from Russia and China, for example. Financial sanctions can come in many forms, including export restrictions, asset seizures, disincentivising of trade, and even full-scale trade embargoes.
The central question remains, however: do sanctions work?
We should begin our answer with a question: do they work to achieve what? If the objective is to prevent jumping towards open conflict against a hostile power acting against a country’s interests: then, yes. In terms of instigating regime change, however, it isn’t as clear-cut. Vali Nasr, one of the world’s leading Middle East and international studies experts, says that “What we have found [in our study] is that it works in ways that we don’t want it to work. And it doesn’t work in the ways that we want it to work.”. Although sanctions on Iran, which have been implemented in response to nuclear weapon treaty violations, have caused enormous national unemployment and devastated the economy, they have not resulted in de-throning the current political status quo. Rather, they have promoted the cultivation of financial loophole exploitation and black market goods growth. In the case of nuclear weaponry pursuits, this will not only allow for the proliferation of illegal weaponry, but also the enrichment of regimes willing to sell materials to Iran.
In the case of Russia, now the most sanctioned country in the world following the invasion of Ukraine, the story appears somewhat different. Restrictions placed on Russian resources, military technology, and financial sectors have undeniably inflicted damage on the national economy. GDP per capita, which measures the average person’s income in US dollars, shows a decline from an average annual salary of USD $15,000 to $13,000 in Russia from 2022 onwards. But the Russian economy has adapted to these sanctions: trends in the oil market keep revenues to the Russian economy available, and a labour shortage means that jobs with higher wages than normal are easy to obtain and maintain. Perhaps most obviously: the sanctions have not ended the war in Ukraine, nor have they led to any type of regime change in Russia.
Furthermore, countries had threatened sanctions prior to the outbreak of the invasion of Ukraine, allowing time for Russian money to be moved elsewhere. The UAE was a popular destination for finances to remain largely untouched.
Some countries even use incoming sanctions to their advantage. Scholars have identified that military and single-party states can use the existence of these barriers to justify their grip on power, citing the constant “threat” of incoming pressure from foreign adversary, while increasing taxes to adjust for economic woes. In North Korea, the ruling party uses sanctions to actually depict its people as “empowered”, a rallying cry for those struggling against foreign oppression in an almost ultra-nationalistic tone.
Ultimately, it seems that sanctions are less effective than those imposing them intend. While they have certainly damaged the economies of their targets, they have often led to unintended, non-financial consequences. Restrictions placed on Iran have led to the growth of a nuclear black market, those placed on Russia have fueled arguments that a new Cold War is now in effect, and those placed on North Korea have further entrenched the Korean Worker’s Party. New solutions will need to be found to new problems - or old solutions will risk making them worse.
TAI Score: Degree 3. In addition to ensuring that businesses and governments do not conduct business with sanctioned individuals or groups, sanctions must ensure a lack of knock-on effects. Proper due diligence and long-term analyses of financial sanctions should be taken before they are put into place, and states should be less inclined to threaten sanctions before they take place - allowing for an increased element of strategic ambiguity against rivals.
Will Britain Be Democratically Alone?
There’s been quite a turnaround from nearly ten years ago.
In July the Brexit referendum shocked the world by being publicly approved, which (arguably) signaled the beginning of political chaos in Westminster - with five Prime Ministers holding office in eight years, including one that lasted less than two months in office. Meanwhile, in the rest of Europe, politics had been largely holding steady. In France, the 2012 elections resulted in more than half of all votes going to Hollande and Sarkozy, two largely centrist candidates. Germany’s federal elections in 2013 resulted in approximately two-thirds of the Bundestag’s seats going to centre and centre-left parties, the Dutch elections in 2017 went to the incumbent’s centre-right party, and centre-right coalitions secured their leadership bids in Spain and Italy in 2015 and 2018, respectively.
In fact, during the last decade, the only country other than Britain to shift to the right in a major and unanticipated way was the United States, which saw the election of Donald Trump in 2016.
This decade looks quite different, however.
The result of this past July’s general election in the UK were a relief to many, but a surprise to few. On July 3rd, one day before voters headed to the polls, the UK’s Labour Party was estimated to be a staggering 18 points ahead of the Conservative Party - which was, in reality, a decrease from October when Labour led in the polls by an astonishing 31 points. A very clear and decisive shift has taken place in British politics that has taken us back to the centre-left after 14 years of perceived disorganisation from the Conservative Party.
In the rest of Europe, however, there has been an undeniable shift to the right. Germany’s right-wing AfD party has come second in the country’s European parliament elections, the right-wing National Rally has made record-breaking gains in France, Geert Wilders has become one of the most powerful politicians in the Netherlands, and elections in 2022 voted a right-wing parties into power in Italy and Sweden. In several EU countries, this is explained by factors including (but neither universal nor limited to) concerns over migration, economics, better organisation of right- and far-right parties, and gradual normalisation of their ideologies through the mainstream’s adoption of ideas or partnership with them directly. This is occurring at the same time as the US presidential election campaign, which is facing similar outcomes for similar reasons. Election polls on the other side of the Atlantic show a currently neck-and-neck result.
Ultimately, this shows a striking phenomenon: almost ten years ago, Britain and the USA shifted to the right while the rest of Europe held onto centrist ideals. Now, Britain has shifted left while Europe moves to the right. Ultimately, we will need to wait and see if the USA shifts back to the right again as well - leaving Britain as the most major centre-left power in the West.
TAI Score: Degree 3. While the election of right-wing parties throughout the West is not in itself a significant threat, the implications beyond this shift may hold a much more serious outcome. Funding for projects such as solutions to climate change and the responsible handling of human rights in questions of irregular migration patterns may become subject to risk. Perhaps more significantly, security matters - such as ongoing support for Ukraine - may find themselves vulnerable. Key decision makers will need to remain aware of political shifts in Europe and the United States, and plan accordingly.
The Social Credit System
Policing people is extremely difficult.
Of course, more extreme crimes are far and few between, and are normally handled on a case-by-case basis. But while we have laws against littering, loitering, jaywalking, and smoking near the entrance to buildings, the fact of the matter is that it’s near impossible to control the way people behave without centuries of cultural norms - or exceptionally harsh penalties for violations. Perhaps the most famous (and often outrageous) modern example of disproportionate response was the former president of The Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, who told a crowd of 300,000 the night before he was elected in 2016, “You drug pushers, holdup men, and do-nothings, you better get out because I'll kill you.” before launching an anti-drug war that may have amounted to crimes against humanity due to its level of extrajudicial killings.
The Chinese social credit system (SCS), which turns a decade old this year, has thankfully never killed anyone. But its presence in China’s vast society is powerful nonetheless.
China’s government published a document around the time of the SCS’ creation stating that “Accelerating the construction of a social credit system is an important basis for comprehensively implementing the scientific development view and building a harmonious Socialist society…and stimulating the development of society and the progress of civilization.”.
In theory, the system is simple: individuals performing actions deemed favourable by the government are rewarded with a higher score, while actions deemed negative towards society are given a lower score and penalised. This information is captured along a vast network of sources: CCTV cameras (of which an estimated 54% of the world’s supply exist in China) supported by facial recognition software and artificial intelligence, Internet algorithms, and more.
Although the exact methodology of the SCS is a secret held by the Communist Party, what is known is that it ranks individuals nationwide for a variety of offences - including ones as minor as bad driving, posting fake or anti-government content online, or smoking in areas where it isn’t allowed. Businesses in particular can also be subject to social credit scores for fraud, illegal fundraising, or debt evasion - MERICS actually identifies that most published SCS reports target companies, likely in a move to continue improving China’s economy and global perceptions thereof.
So what’s behind the scores themselves, which rank from 0 - 1300?
Positive actions - like praising the government online, cleaning up litter, and donating blood - assign a high score to an individual that can result in faster Internet speeds, priority in healthcare, schooling, and better jobs. For businesses, which are particularly subject to the SCS system, this could mean fewer inspections and audits, better interest rates at banks, and even faster processing of tax returns. For individuals with a more rebellious nature participating in “disgraceful” actions, slower Internet speeds, public transportation bans, and even public shaming are all potential - if not certain - punishments.
The system, however, is not centralised - a somewhat unusual trend for the single-party state. Although the amount of data collected and processed by the system is colossal, it remains “disjointed” and non-standardised across provinces at this time.
While supporters of the system point out that it contributes to public safety and upholds laws, critics identify that the practice is invasive and too prone to mistakes. Whether the SCS continues to become more robust and centralised is likely, but uncertain. Given its vast capability to change an individual or business’ everyday life, however, it’s not likely to be something that vanishes any time soon.
TAI Score: Degree 2. A security crisis arising from the Chinese social credit system is extremely unlikely, and foreign nationals remaining excluded from the system greatly reduces individual risk. Nevertheless, business leaders and individuals should remain aware of its implications and existence - while non-Chinese citizens are not subject to its regulations, foreign businesses operating in China appear to be. This will become increasingly critical over time as the system centralises and becomes standardised nationwide.
The City of Darkness
It’s amazing how many different ways we, as a human race, live.
There are those of us in the jungle, atop mountains, in cities, and way out on the open plains. There are those who live in Alert, Canada, the northernmost permanently inhabited place in the world 1300 miles away from Iqaluit - the next largest city, which itself had a population of less than 8,000 in 2016. The average temperature for July in Alert is just 7 degrees Celsius. This is a stark contrast from the 24 degrees on average that locals in Miyake-jima, Japan face - and where they are required to wear a gas mask at all times due to poisonous gases from high-frequency volcanic activity. Miyake-jima, however, is likely more culturally homogenous than Auroville, India, an internationally-endorsed social experiment in Tamil Nadu where 50,000 people from around the world seek to live in intentional harmony with both nature and one another. Auroville isn’t far away from North Sentinel Island, where the local tribe still lives with Stone Age technology and violently kills anyone who attempts to visit.
One human settlement, however, did find itself growing so far out of control that the local government ordered its complete destruction.
The former site of Kowloon’s Walled City, also known as the City of Darkness, lies just a thirty minutes’ drive from the hospital where I was born. Originally settled as a military fort by China, it quickly became home to enormous numbers of as-yet unprocessed refugees fleeing the violence of the Chinese Civil War and political persecution. Unable to maintain operations in a territory surrounded by foreign powers, Chinese lack of use for the fort led to it falling into disrepair - and worse.
The amount of illegal settlements, crime, and anarchy quickly led to Kowloon becoming known as “Hak Nam”, Cantonese for “City of Darkness”. This was a result of its almost unthinkably dense population - the densest on Earth, with 50,000 people in 0.025 square kilometers - meaning that neither the British nor Chinese could enforce laws within. For comparison, this rate is, at the Walled City’s peak, 119 times denser than New York City is today. Opium dens, brothels, and even unlicensed dentists operated within the Walled City in the 1950s and 1960s.
And yet, paradoxically, some public services continued. Atlas Obscura has written a fascinating article about the Walled City’s only postman, responsible for delivering mail to an area less than 300 square meters in size but with “350 buildings, almost all between 10 and 14 stories high, occupied by 8,500 premises, 10,700 households, and more than 33,000 residents.”. In the face of being unable to receive most public systems, however, the community largely looked after one another - even if it meant doing so without official regulation.
Naturally, the local government found itself with a need to address the lawless situation. With much of the real power laying in the hands of organised crime syndicates, the city government launched a wave of anti-corruption campaigns in the 1970s that tackled them directly. From there, efforts to begin its demolition began in 1987, and were completed in 1993. The timing is no accident - with the handover of Hong Kong back to China taking place in 1997, government pushback against the settlement did not take place.
Today, the site on which the City of Darkness stood is about as stark of a contrast as it could be: a green park now sits adjacent to Tung Tau Tsuen Road. Its legacy, however, lives on in a number of pop culture references, casinos, and documentarians seeking inspiration for anarchy and hedonism by drawing upon the Walled City’s status as a territory claimed by two countries, but neglected by both.
TAI Score: Degree 0. Kowloon Walled City’s demolition in the early 1990’s may not have eradicated the threat of Chinese organised crime, but the lack of a disorganised, anarchic settlement in Hong Kong will have certainly contributed to the city’s overall safety. In fact, Hong Kong routinely ranks as one of the world’s top twenty safest cities, and one of Asia’s top ten, in 2024. There is no modern threat from the Walled City or its legacy that decision makers or business leaders need to be aware of - rather, many have capitalised on the risks that it used to hold decades ago.
Europe’s Next Major Conflict - A Forecast
At the time of writing this article, the war in Ukraine is slightly over six months away from entering its third year. Russian ambitions in eastern Europe are arguably at their highest since the late 1980s, and the world’s security landscape is looking decreasingly stable. The relative peace that Europe has enjoyed since the late 1940s, with a possible break in the late 1990s, seems to be on the decline as time goes on.
So where is the next conflict in Europe likely to emerge? At this time, Kosovo seems like a likely candidate.
Largely unrecognised outside of the Western world (with a few exceptions in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia), Kosovo is a small area of land in (or, depending on who you ask, next to) southern Serbia. The territory is approximately the same size as Lebanon or Jamaica in terms of land area, and is home to less than two million people - about the same size as Rabat or Warsaw in terms of population.
Recent history has not been kind to Kosovars.
Violence in Kosovo is a product of ethnic tensions between Albania, which ethnically represents the majority of the local population, and Serbia, the country of which Kosovo has historically belonged to as a province. Decades of oppression took place under the Serbian government, including police brutality and arrest rates so high that the territory emerged as Europe’s most distinct region for human rights violations. Kosovo thus declared independence in 2008 - an outcome which Serbia (unlike the United States and major EU nations) continues to deny as legitimate to this day.
So how does a 16-year-old independence movement emerge as a leading contender for the next security crisis in Europe?
To begin with, we should never underestimate the potential for security breakdowns in the Balkan Peninsula to quickly draw in major players, resulting in conflicts that far outsize their origins. The First World War effectively began in Serbia, and the breakdown of Yugoslavia eighty years later resulted in the Bosnian Genocide at the hands of Serbian forces. Later that very decade, a Serbian crackdown against Kosovar separatists went so far as to pull in NATO forces. One does not need to look particularly far into the past to recognise how ethnic tensions in the Balkans have caused significant crises - and it is not difficult to imagine how it may happen again.
Further complicating the situation is Serbia’s backing by Russia and, increasingly, China. This network of alliances - Albania, Kosovo, and the West, against Serbia, Russia, and China - is a perfect example of how, as previously stated, the outcome of a crisis in the Balkans can quickly become dramatically inflated, just as it did 110 years ago. And the results are clear: in May 2024, Kosovo’s Prime Minister himself stated that “The threat of war in the Balkans is not merely a theoretical one…[it is] real.”.
TAI Score: Degree 4. Despite the tension in itself being geographically contained between non-nuclear and relatively small states, the situation in Kosovo remains uncertain and holds high potential to become another proxy clash between NATO and Russia. The lack of a definitive path forward, combined with the issue serving as yet another vector for conflict not only in the Balkans, but also for major external actors, mean that constant monitoring of the situation is required. Diplomacy, compromise, and further study of how ethnic identity impacts security throughout the world will all be required to avoid another catastrophe in Europe.
The Modern Warsaw Pact
Formed during the midst of the Cold War’s early years, the Warsaw Pact was a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European states. It was established in 1955 as a counter-balance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that had been implemented six years prior, and was led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, Russia. In addition to the USSR, the Warsaw Pact included Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia (now the two separate countries of Czechia and Slovakia). For those curious, a the founding charter of the Warsaw Pact can be found here.
As one might expect, the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, mere months before the wholesale end to the Soviet Union. Not long after, however, a new, less well-known alliance arose in its place.
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (henceforth, and more commonly, referred to as the CSTO) was founded in 2002, based on a treaty from ten years prior. According to Nikolai Bordyuzha from the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) in Germany, the priority goals of the CSTO are “to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability, and to defend on a collective basis the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of member states.”.
Much like the Warsaw Pact, the CSTO is led from Moscow, though its membership has largely shifted from eastern Europe to Central Asia, now including Russia, Belarus, Armenia*, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Most recently, the CSTO made headlines during its intervention in Kazakhstan during civil unrest in January of 2022 - Kazakhstan’s president (falsely) claimed that “threats from outside” existed, thus justifying a request for CSTO troops to restore order. The organisation’s intervention, however, was largely symbolic: most of the troops came from Russia to protect major infrastructure and strategic national assets such as airports and government buildings, rather than actively suppressing protests. Upon their departure, the CSTO declared the operation “a success”.
Critics of the CSTO, naturally, do not agree with this assessment. Finabel, the European Land Force Commanders Organisation, identifies that CSTO members are looking elsewhere for security guarantees - namely, China. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation in Germany further asserts that Moscow “does not have the resources [or willpower] to turn the CSTO into a manageable instrument to support its political ambitions.”. The American Georgetown Journal of International Affairs has even gone so far as to refer to it as a “Shambling, lifeless alliance”.
Whatever the case may be - it appears that at face value, the CSTO is either not designed to be, or not capable of being, a counterweight to NATO. But it may still serve as an excellent example for Russia’s desire to maintain a sphere of influence and hegemony in the former Soviet Union - even outside of Europe.
*At the time of writing this article, Armenia is making headlines for declaring its departure from the CSTO.
TAI Score: Degree 2. While the phenomenon of Russia’s ongoing desire for influence in the former Soviet world poses significant security risks, particularly in eastern Europe, the CSTO itself is likely not a significant threat to outside actors. A lack of active participation in suppressing Kazakh protests, combined with the loss of Armenia as a member, signify the the organisation likely lacks the strength it needs to carry out its - or Moscow’s - objectives.